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The Crisis of
Subjectivity from
Nietzsche to Heidegger

Gianni Vattimo

1. NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER AND POSTMODERNITY

The title of this paper should not be understood in a narrowly
chronological way, as if we merely wanted to explore the history
of the notion of subjectivity during that period of philosophy that
begins with Nietzsche and ends with Heidegger. I believe that
these two names mark out a unifying theoretical strand which
indicates a continuous development transcending their different
approaches or results. This development can have philosophical
significance to the degree that it involves the destiny, the vicissitudes not only of the notion of subject in the two thinkers, but
also of the subject itself in an epoch of which Nietzsche and
Heidegger are here considered the supreme interpreters. In other
words, our initial thesis is that there exists between Nietzsche
and Heidegger a substantial theoretical continuity, and that they
[Translatedfrom the Italian by Peter Carravetta]

DIFFERENT/A

1

(Autumn 1986)

DIFFERENT/A

6

are basically saying "the same thing." To acknowledge this "same
thing" means pointing to certain conceptual parallels and
analogies between the two thinkers and then proceeding to place
these similarities within an epochal horizon in order to see them
as modes of revelation of a destiny which concerns (our) subjectivity in the present age.
.
Obviously, we are not dealing with a set of "neutral" or descriptive premises. And if this is true for every discourse in philosophy-even
the most explicitly programmatic study of sources
and "data" -then it ought to be especially valid for thinkers like
Nietzsche and Heidegger who described themselves as "epochal"
thinkers: representatives of a way of thinking whose "truth" is
also and perhaps above all the truth of an epoch. In this they
resemble Hegel, though their tone is fundamentally criticaldestructive rather than triumphant.
The thesis concerning a concrete theoretical continuity
between Nietzsche and Heidegger is not at all so evident if we
recall how Heidegger himself considers Nietzsche the culmination
of metaphysics and its inherent nihilism. Heidegger in fact considers it his task to go beyond metaphysics and nihilism, suggesting
his radical discontinuity with the tradition that peaks in Nietzsche.
Of course, in Heidegger's own texts dealing with this problem-in
a sense, this means all his mature writings-the
relationship between post-metaphysical thought and the nihilism of achieved
[compiuta] metaphysics is not so clear-cut and schematic, and raises
several interpretive problems. And while it is acceptable to call
Nietzsche a nihilist, calling Heidegger one can seem scandalous.
This issue could be developed at length. 1 Yet I feel that one of
the most pressing tasks for philosophy today, one of its crucial
theoretical aims, consists precisely in clarifying the ambiguities of
the Nietzsche-Heidegger
relationship-recognizing
their profound continuity, the fact that they say the "same thing": nihilism.
If, as we hinted above, this continuity is not only a fact that
can be inferred from the texts of these two philosophers, but also
perhaps above all the result of a reflection on their epochal meaning, then clearly in this second sense we must, as good hermeneutists, fall back on a shared "pre-understanding"
of the salient traits
of our present epoch. This pre-understanding
is, after all, what
gave life to philosophy when it appealed to "experience," which
was never that imprinting of signs and traces on the mental tabula
rasa of a distorted, schematic empiricism. Rather, pre-understanding is a historically qualified experience, "knowledge of the
world," familiarity and expectation, memory, language. So the

GIANNI VATTIMO

7

thesis of the continuity between Nietzsche and Heidegger is based
not only on the ir texts, but also on our pre-understanding
of the
meaning of our historical existence in the present age. Reflecting
upon this continuity means, therefore, activating and deepening
this pre-understanding which, though seemingly vague and indeterminate, is nonetheless the guide and support of all thinking
processes . As the horizon of our experience, such a supporting
[reggente]pre-understanding
must remain by and large implicit,
though it is important to remain aware of it and its possibilities.
In fact, it can even be perceived through the several signs and
"symptoms" of our discourse. For instance, the theoretical as well
as experiential-epochal horizon within which we can speak of a
Nietzsche-Heidegger continuity, together with the corollary of a
Heideggerian "nihilism," coincides with what hermeneutics calls
the philosophical koine of our epoch. 2 In other words, though we
cannot once and for all give form to the contemporary pre-understanding which acts as the background of the Nietzsche-Heidegger
continuity, we can certainly describe some of its traits more
precisely. One of these is the demonstrable, pervasive presencesince at least the mid-seventies-of
hermeneutics. This philosophy, which revolves around the problem of interpretation, harks
back to Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Nietzsche and Heidegger, and
was developed in different directions but with shared concerns
by philosophers like Gadamer, Pareyson, Ricoeur, Jauss and
Rorty, who contributes an explicit attention to pragmatism. Thus
broadly understood, hermeneutics can include philosophers such
as Karl Otto Apel, the most recent Habermas, Foucault, and Derrida, whose philosophies do not properly speaking belong to its
main trunk yet are profoundly related to it. Above all, the hermeneutic koine constitutes today not only a field for theoretical
speculation, but the underlying methodological self-consciousness
of much literary and art criticism and of many trends in history,
psychology and the social sciences . In short, the role and position
of hermeneutics in contemporary European thought can be compared-though
with different modalities and implications-to
the
importance of Marxism in the fifties 3 and structuralism in the
sixties-seven ties .
If this is the situation, then we are living in an age whose
characteristic cultural "atmosphere" or "mood" facilitates the understanding of the Nietzsche-Heidegger continuity. In fact, above
and beyond Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, hermeneutics is
the unifying thread of the two philosophies . I believe that in
speaking of this relationship I am not necessarily endorsing some
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misguided historiography, or-as Habermas said of Gadamer 4excessive "urbanization" of both Nietzsche and Heidegger, but
the fact that there is indeed such a deeply rooted process in motion
within our culture. If it is to remain true to the imperative of
"saving the phenomena" which has guided it since ancient times,
then philosophical reflection must reckon with this fact of our
everyday experience, must "save" it.
To conclude these prefatory remarks, 5 it is likely that recognizing this concrete continuity between Nietzsche and Heidegger
constitutes also the decisive trait of what we call the postmodern
in philosophy. As will become evident shortly, this continuity
actually points toward the dissolution not only of "modern" subjectivity, but also, and more generically, of being itself-no longer
structure but event, no longer origin or foundation but calling
and "narration" [racconto]. This seems to be the sense of that
devaluation [alleggerimento]of reality which is taking place in our
lives, which are determined by those typically postmodern transformations of technology. 6
2. FROM THE UNMASKING OF THE SUBJECT TO NIHILISM

Within this perspective, let me dwell further on my title's
"crisis of subjectivity." If there is a difference between Nietzsche
and Heidegger, it is this: Heidegger achieves that passage into
postmodernity which Nietzsche merely announces and sets in
motion. Yet there are parallels in their writings about postmodernity's crisis of the subject.
In Nietzsche the crisis of subjectivity is announced primarily
as the unmasking of the superficiality of consciousness. 7 This is
one of the meanings of The Birth of Tragedy's distinction between
Apollonian and Dionysian. Socrates, the champion of the Apollonian-of what is definite, rational, disengaged from the Dionysian:
myth, irrationality, sensuality, the experience of living and
dying-is also the champion of self-consciousness. How else justify his "knowing that he does not know"? But it is precisely
to the degree that he absolutizes, distancing himself from his
mythical, irrational, vital Dionysian roots to assume the task of a
global Aufkliirung, that his Apollonian rationality loses all vitality
and becomes decadence. The Birth of Tragedy's criterion for condemning Socratism is not truth, but life; Socratic self-consciousness is "critiqued" and unmasked not because it is non-true, but
because it is non-vital.
This prefigures
several complex
developments in Nietzsche's subsequent unmasking of definite
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forms, of values, and of the very notion of truth. The "suspicion"
aroused by self-conscious subjectivity is certainly inspired by the
discovery that the forms which fed it, previously considered stable
and definite, are actually "false," being no more than sublimating
appearances designed to comfort. However, these forms are unmasked and condemned not only for this, but also because, much
like Socratic "'enlightened" rationalism, they aspire to truth, forgetting that as deceptions they are bound to life, to the Dionysian.
The complexity of this perspective will be found, expressed differently, in Nietzsche's subsequent work, yet already in The Birth of
Tragedy we find that he cannot stop with the unmasking of superficiality, of non-truth, of the self-consciousness of the subject: he
must go on, advancing toward nihilism and the dissolution of the
very notions of truth and being.
In the works that follow The Birth of Tragedy, beginning with
the Untimely Meditations and Human, Too Human, the unmasking
of the superficiality of the self-conscious subject will in fact develop
side by side with the unmasking of the notion of truth and with
the broader dissolution of being as foundation. One can in fact
say that the most representative expression of the crisis of subjectivity in Nietzsche is the announcement that "God is dead," which
is formulated for the first time in The Gay Scienceand can be used
as the emblematic utterance of Nietzsche's whole itinerary after
his text on tragedy.
Nietzsche's radical unmasking of the superficiality of the I
proceeds mainly through the awareness of the interplay of forces
in social relations, especially power relations. The unpublished
text On Truth and Deceit in an Extra-Moral Sense shows how the
world of truth and logic is constructed on the basis of an" obligation
to deceive according to rules," socially determined and according
to a system of metaphors warranted and legitimized by society.
At the same time, all other metaphoric systems which herald
creativity in the individual, if not relegated to the unconscious,
are demoted to "poetic fictions." Human, Too Human will conduct
its entire critique of knowledge with similar arguments, insisting
also on the fact that what we consider conscious experience is
whatever we have a language for, names and possibilities of description in a socially convened and imposed model language.
The world of consciousness will therefore tend to attain the configuration of a world of awarenesses shared by society and imposed on us via the conditioning that language requires. But
there's more: for the contents of our consciousness that concern
the phenomenal world are not the only "fictions" regulated by
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social conventions; the image the I has of itself, in short self-consciousness in its true sense, is now seen as the image of ourselves
which others communicate to us (and which we accept and adopt
for reasons of security: in order to defend ourselves we must in
fact introject others' perceptions of us, making our calculations
accordingly; in the struggle for survival, mimicry, camouflage
[mimetismo] is a crucial instrument). 8 That which we call egoism
is therefore only an "apparent egoism," as the title of aphorism
105 in Dawn says explicitly:

Pseudo-egoism.-Whatever they may think and say about their
'egoism,' the great majority nonetheless do nothing for their ego
their whole life long: what they do is done for the phantom of their
ego which has formed itself in the heads of those around them and
has been communicated to them; . .. all of them dwell in a fog of
impersonal, semi-personal opinions ... all these people, unknown to themselves, believe in the bloodless abstraction 'man,'
that is to say, in a fiction. [Hollingdale trans .]

This fiction is precisely the result of these impersonal, diffuse and
all-pervading opinions which go on developing independently
from the lives of individuals. The "social phantom" character of
the ego has both "linguistic" and "disciplinary" roots . Linguistic
because in order to communicate there's an obligation to deceive
according to a system of socially accepted lies or metaphors; disciplinary because the necessity to communicate our needs to others
forces us to know and describe them in a systematic manner which
is ultimately superficial. All of these exigencies seem to culminate
in the retation between "those who command and those who
obey," a relation which above all else requires self-consciousness. 9
If, on the one hand, the critique of the superficiality of consciousness and therefore of the subject in its most classical,
metaphysical definition develops in the direction of the unmasking
of its alleged immediacy and "finality," and is brought back to
the interplay of forces over which the subject has no control (being
rather its result and expression); on the other hand, as it first
appeared in the play between the Apollonian and the Dionysian
in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche continues at the same time on
the road toward the ever more explicit awareness of the "necessity
of error" (cf . Human, Too Human, Part I), a condition expressed in
emblematic terms in aphorism 361 of The Gay Science, "The Problem
of the Comedian," where we find an entire philosophy of culture
as the production of "lies," systems of concepts and values that
have no possibility of being "legitimated" vis-a-vis the true reality
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of things. These lawful deceits are borne by and multiply solely
from the manifestation of a capacity to lie and to mask oneself
which, though in origin an instrument of defense and survival,
is now autonomous and develops beyond any possible vital function. Thus lying, metaphor, the inventiveness of culture creating
worlds of appearances cannot any longer legitimize itself in terms
of foundation, not even with the perspective of a vitalistic pragmatism. The discovery of lying, or of "dreaming" (as Nietzsche
says in aphorism 54 of The Gay Science) does not mean that we
can stop lying and dreaming, but only that we must continue
dreaming knowing that we are dreaming: only thus can we avoid
perishing.
The whirlwind circularity of the conclusion of aphorism 54
in The Gay Science locates, in its broadest implications, the terms
of the "crisis of subjectivity" the way Nietzsche discovered it and
lived it: once unmasked, the superficiality of consciousness does
not become the path to a new, more secure foundation. The non-finality of consciousness means, on the other hand, the end of any
finality [ultimita], the impossibility, therefore, of thinking in terms
of a foundation, and from that the general need to make adjustments in the definition of truth and of being. This broadening of
the unmasking discourse to its most radical and vast ontological
terms is actually the direction Nietzsche's mature works take,
from Zarathustra onward. This period is marked by the discovery
of the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same, of nihilism, of
the will to power and the overman: all these terms define, much
more than a positive, Nietzschean philosophy, his own ever problematic effort to realize an ontology after the end of foundational
thinking, after the death of God. As far as the problem of subjectivity is concerned, the term with which Nietzsche defines his
vision of a humanity no longer "subject(ed)" (in all its meanings
and correlations, from subjectivity to subjugation) is that of Uebermensch, superman [superuomo]or, better, overman [oltreuomo].10
The problem with the notion of the overman consists in the
fact that its most typical reading seems to lead to the position of
metaphysical subjectivity-self-consciousness,
self-control, will to
power against others-and,
what's more, a subjectivity that
strengthens its more traditional aspects. Yet in the philosophy of
eternal recurrence, in which "there are no facts, only interpretations, " 11 even the idea that there could only be interpreters "is
only an interpretation."
Everything is subjective, you say; but this is already an interpretation,
the "subject" is not a given, it is only something added through

DIFFERENT/A

12

the imagination , something stuck on afterwards. Is it finally necessary to place the interpreter behind the interpretation? But this is
already invention, hypothesis. 12

If it is difficult to establish what or who is the overman, one thing
is certain: it is not a strengthened form of metaphysical subjectivity, at least not in the sense of self-consciousness and will. In fact
even will itself, which does nevertheless play such a central role
in the later Nietzsche, is taken within the interplay of negation
and de-founding [sfondamento]according to which everything is
interpretation, even this very thesis. Within this context, what
appears to give a positive-though
problematic-characterization
to man no longer subject, is his capacity to negate himself as
subject, to go beyond all imperatives of self-preservation in the
direction of limitless experimentation. This suggests, to some extent, the Schopenhauerian version of Kant's aesthetic disinterest,
though radicalized even more.13
Ascetic Ideals and all the complex, cruel games that moral
and metaphysical man has played and dealt himself-and
which
today are further developed by the mindless hubris of technicians
and engineers 14-all seem to attest to the fact that with man there
came upon the earth an unprecedented phenomenon, an animal
capable of turning against himself, against his own spirit of selfpreservation:
the existence on earth of an animal soul turned against itself, taking
sides against itself, was something so new, profound, unheard of,
enigmatic, contradictory, and pregnant with a future that the aspect
of the earth was essentially altered. 15

The capacity to experiment beyond the interests of conservation
is realized, according to Nietzsche, in the mindless or casual [spensierata]inventiveness of the technicians and the engineers-which
makes one think that science and technology have a decisive role
in defining man's new position, no longer subject, in the world.
But these are fleeting remarks . For Nietzsche, the exemplary figure
of the overman is, in a fundamental sense, the artist . The "ultrahuman" path of art which he sketches in his last writings seems
to point to the two main roads traveled by the avant-gardes of
the twentieth century: on the one hand, the will to forms, the
most radical technical experimentation conceivable; and on the
other the dissolution of any rule of form in the name of an art no
longer subjected to constructive ideals, but rather well on its way
to the extreme experience of destructuration, toward the end of
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any hierarchy within the product as well as of the artist or consumer as "subjects."
The open-ended problematic in which the figure of the overman remains does not only, or primarily, indicate a theoretical
inconclusiveness
or even an aporia that may characterize
Nietzsche's thought. In expanding to a general ontological discourse that beckons the dissolution of being as foundation, this
problematic alludes to the impossibility of redefining subjectivity
by means of a simple theoretical design, with a "clarification" of
concepts or a taking hold of errors. Metaphysics, Heidegger
claims, is not merely an error we can escape, an opinion we can
discard once we recognize its falsity. 16 Thus the collapse [insostenibilita] of the notion of subjectivity reflects the collapse of subjectivity itself in the world, in the present epoch of being: it cannot
find a pacifying theoretical resolution at the hands of some clever
thinker.
The same itinerary that stretches from the unmasking of the
metaphysical subject to the dissolution of being as foundation and
to nihilism can also be employed to characterize Heidegger's meditation, though in different terms. Here again I must proceed
sketchily, referring the reader to my more extensive treatments
of the topic. 17 Guided loosely by the analogy with Nietzsche, one
might say that what we can call the "unmasking" [smascheramento]
of the subject in Heidegger's thought is the critique of the conceptions of man as a Vorhandenes, a "thing" among many other things
characterized solely by specific attributes (for example,as Heidegger says in his text on Humanism, the metaphysical definition of
man as a member of the animal genus endowed with reason as
its specific difference) . In Being and Time man is not thinkable as
a subject precisely because this would make him something
"merely present ." Man is, instead, the Dasein, being-there [l'esserci], that is, above all, projection. For Heidegger, the subject is
characterized by a substantiality which is no longer present in
Dasein as project: man is defined not as a given determinate substance, but as a "having-to-be," an opening upon possibility. Dasein thinks of itself as subject, that is, as substance, only when it
thinks itself inauthentically, with the horizon of the public and
everyday "they ." 18
The "definition" of Dasein in terms of projection rather than
in terms of subjectivity does not, however, evidence the character
of an unmasking which leads to a new and more satisfying (and
reassuring) foundation . To say that Dasein is projection opens
up, in fact, the question of authenticity, which is central to Sein
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und Zeit and, in different terms, throughout Heidegger's subsequent development. Since the project cannot be made authentic
by referring to any sort of pre-given substantiality-for
example,
a "nature," or an essence, etc.-it can only achieve authenticity
by choosing the possibility which is most proper, but not in the
sense of "appropriate" (which legitimates by referring to a basic
structure or substance), but in the sense of being unavoidable and
ever open as possibility which, as long as Dasein is, remains such.
This "most proper" possibility is the impending possibility of
death. The project which is Dasein is authentically chosen only
insofar as it decides ahead of time with regard to its own death.
As is well known, Heidegger refuses to describe in existential
terms the meaning of this anticipatory decision: it does not obvi ously correspond to the decision to put an end to one's life by
means of suicide, nor does it entail a "thinking about death" in
terms of the Christian warning about becoming dust. 19 The content
couched in the notion of the anticipatory decision concerning
death is rather to be sought in those pages of the second section
pages which open up with the problemof Being and Time-those
atic of being-towards-death-where
Heidegger speaks of our historical heritage (see especially par. 74); and in those pages where
he speaks of the relationship of Dasein with others (par. 53). The
meaning of these pages can be gathered by reading a passage
from a much later work, Der Satz vom Grund, 20 in which Heidegger
no longer speaks of authenticity or inauthenticity. These terms
and problems are now channeled, and transformed, in the new
thematic of the eventuality of being. The shift can be best understood if we bear in mind the terminology of the original German:
authentic is eigentlich; event is Er-eignis. What they both have in
common is the root eigen, which means "proper." In this passage,
what in Being and Time was the anticipatory decision concerning
death now becomes the "leap" in the abyss of the "liberating tie
with tradition . " 21 The tradition of which Heidegger speaks in Der
Satz vom Grund is not what in Being and Time is called Tradition,
which was characterized as an acceptance of the past as both dead
and irrevocable (therefore anything but liberating). Within Tradition the past is conceived as vergangen, and this represents the
mode according to which inauthentic experience is related to the
past. True authentic existence thinks the past, instead, as gewesen
-not as "past," dead and irrevocable, but as "having been"-and
its tradition is now called Ueber-lieferung, with the German root
word meaning ueber-liefern, that is, trans-mitting. If we now turn
to Being and Time for the difference between Tradition and Ueberlieferung, between accepting the past as vergangen and the capacity
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to hand it down as gewesen, we find that in the latter case the past
is accepted within the perspective of the anticipatory decision of
death. Only by projecting itself in anticipation of one's own death
can Being see the past as history, as a heritage of yet open possibilities which speak as models of possibility as well as possible
models. The authentic relationship with the past is opened up by
the awareness of one's own mortality, a condition that assumes
as only mortal even the traces and the models which have been
handed down through history. The leap into the Ueberlieferungis
a liberating move because it removes us from the order of the
"given," that is, from what is inherited (and within which the
project of Dasein finds itself thrown), or the finality of a "natural
order": the leap into the Ueberlieferungis (only) event, only trace
of other possible-mortal existences which Dasein accepts or rejects
as possibilities still open to it. 22
What we are dealing with is a topic which seems very far
from Nietzsche's. The similarity and the parallels which, in this
light, exist between the Nietzschean and the Heideggerian
itineraries will appear less problematic if we think for a moment
that here, also, as with Nietzsche, what takes place during the
meditation upon the limits and the untenability of (the notion of)
subjectivity is the discovery of the groundlessness of being. The
discourse on the possible authenticity of Dasein deals in fact with
Being itself, and it is no mere accident that in Heidegger's later
writings this discourse opens up to being as event. The question
of authenticity is not purely a problem of an "ethical" or
"psychological" aspect of that particular being (i.e.: entity) called
Dasein. Already in Being and Time things, objects, the world in its
wholeness come to Being, or give themselves as entities, only
insofar as there's Being-there, Dasein which opens up the horizon
of their givenness. Therefore there's no being outside, or before,
or independently of the thrown project which Dasein is. That this
project can realize itself as authentic only insofar as it decides
concerning its own death-that
is to say, in the form of the liberating bond with tradition, in assuming the historical heritage as
gewesen, possibility, having-been-mortality-all
this means (with
the help of passages which we cannot reconstruct here in analytic
fashion but, which are certainly understandable to the reader of
Heidegger's last writings), that Being is Event, that Being is not,
but happens, gives itself. Within the framework of our guiding
hypothesis, this is also what we can call Heidegger's nihilism.
Like Nietzsche, Heidegger expands the collapse of metaphysical
subjectivity into a general ontological discourse which experiences
the "de-grounding" [sfondamento]of Being by discovering the con-
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stitutive relationship between existence and death. Existence appropriates and becomes authentic [eigen-tlich] only insofar as it
lets itself be expropriated, deciding towards its own death in the
event [Er-eignis]which is both expropriating and transpropriating
[ent-eignend and ueber-eignend].This is being itself as Ueber-lieferung,
transmission of traces, messages, linguistic formations in which
alone our experience of the world is rendered possible, and in
which things come to Being.
This breaking-through or de-grounding towards ontology-a
nihilistic ontology, to be sure, and another trait that links Nietzsche
and Heidegger-takes
place, as hinted above, not as the result of
a pure shifting of concepts, but in relation to more general transformations in the conditions of existence which have to do with
modern technology and its rationalization in today's world. In
Nietzsche, the line of reasoning is very straightforward: the death
of God means the end of belief in ultimate values and foundation,
because these beliefs corresponded to the need for reassurance
typical of a humanity somehow still "primitive." The rationalization <!nd organization of social work and the development of science and technology which have been made possible precisely by
the religious-metaphysical vision of the world (we can think of
the sociology of religion in Max Weber and the relationship he
established between capitalistic science-technology and JudeoChristian monotheism) have rendered these beliefs superfluous.
This is, incidentally, another way of conceiving nihilism. The destiny of subjectivity unveiled in its groundlessness, and the nihilistic dissolution of Being are thus inextricably bound up with each
other and with the history of the technico-scientific rationalization
of the world. It is precisely the technical organization of the world
that makes obsolete both being as foundation and the hierarchic,
dominated structure of self-consciousness or subjectivity.
In Heidegger the passage from the level of the existential
analytic (in Being and Time) to that of the history of metaphysics
as the history of being-which
corresponds to the "turn" in his
thought beginning in the thirties-takes
place precisely in reference to the awareness that, in a world like ours and his, made
up of great historical powers which tend to be totalizing and totalitarian, the essence of man cannot (any longer, if it ever could)
think itself in terms of individual structures, or in terms of suprahistorical definitions . It should not be difficult to show, if we bear
in mind those "historically" more compromised and compromising pages of the Introduction to Metaphysics (the 1935 course in
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which Heidegger addresses explicitly the question of the destiny
of the West, of Germany, Russia and America, and their tendency
to institute themselves as systems of total domination), 23 that the
explication of the "verbal" as opposed to the nominal sense of
essence (Wesen, read as a verb in the infinitive: to become an
essence [essenzializzarsi], to determine-itself each and every time
in a destiny-like manner, in an epochal fashion; to happen [accadere])is linked both to the awareness of the "weight" that historical
superpowers possess in determining the destiny of humanity,
and to the givenness of those "thrown" projections which make
up, each and every time, time and again, the disclosures of the
truth of being in which historical humanities (the historical-destinal "essences" of man) define themselves. Now this "weight" that
leads being to give-itself-to make itself known and happen, take
place in its epochality and to become event-unveils
itself precisely
in the modern world of science-and-technolgy.
This is not, once
again, an "eternal" structure which would in the end become
visible only to ourselves: it is rather the epochal happening (coming-to-being) of being within the framework of the conditions that
can be verified with the technological organization of the world,
which is "tendentially" totalizing. Heidegger will express all of
this much later in certain passages of Identity and Difference, in
which he will speak of the Ge-Stell (which I suggested be translated,
at least in Italian, as im-posizione, im-position), 24 that is, of the
system of total organization typical of the techno-scientific view
of the world, as the fulfillment of metaphysics and as the "first
flash" of the event of being, in short, as a chance to go beyond
metaphysics made possible by the fact that in the Ge-Stell man
and Being lose those very characteristics which metaphysics had
attributed to them-above
all, their position or status as subject
and object. 25
3. BEYOND THE SUBJECT?

It would be yet another metaphysical illusion-implicitly
tied
to the idea that there could be an ordered world of essences-to
think that we can extract a lesson from Nietzsche and Heidegger
on the true nature of subjectivity such that we may correct our
errors concerning this "specific" topos of philosophy. What we
have found, instead, is that the untenability, the internal contradictoriness of the metaphysical conception of the subject (in Nietzsche
the discovery of its superficiality and its non-finality; in Heidegger
the experience of the groundless projection) is given only as the
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collapse of the subject itself in a world radically transformed by
the techno-scientific organization and which brings to its limit,
explicitly for Heidegger and implicitly for Nietzsche, the notion
of metaphysics as the thought of foundations. The "beyonding"
of the metaphysical conception of the subject is, within this perspective, a going beyond the historical-destinal "essences" of
metaphysical subjectivity, and this involves the problem of the
surpassing of metaphysics in its concrete-historical givenness, as
the world of total organization. In short, the fact that Nietzsche's
overman and Heidegger's "re-calling" thought are not so clearly
defined as alternative "solutions" to the crisis of (the notion of)
metaphysical subjectivity should not be taken as a limit or incapacity on the part of either of the two thinkers, but must be understood
as evidence of a "destining" condition-more
specifically, in the
Heideggerian sense of Geschick, which alludes to a "sending" a heritage which calls forth as possibility, and not as a deterministically fixed fate conceivable only within the horizon of
necessitating metaphysical structures. Since the experience of the
Ge-Stell-or of the death of God as announced by Nietzscheplaces us in front of the historic-destining of the Wesen, the coming
to pass of Being, we should not search for guiding threads,
pointers, or legitimations in suprahistorical structures, but ought
to look only at the Geschick, at the ensemble of meanings which,
by taking the risk of interpretation (which can be authentic only
if it projects itself towards death, if it takes the responsibility of
its radical groundlessness), we can succeed in recognizing in the
taking place [accadere]into which we are thrown .
In different ways but following similar motivations, Nietzsche
and Heidegger tell us that this happening be defined as Ge-Stell,
as the world of science-and-technology and that moreover in this
world we must search for the traits of a post-metaphysical humanity which is no longer "subject(ed)" [soggetta].
But isn't the world of science-and-technology also the world
of totalitarian organization, the world of dehumanization,
the
world of planning that reduces every humanity, every individual
experience, every personal expression to a moment of a statistically
foreseeable normality or when it doesn't fall within this middling
capacity, to an accidental marginality devoid of consequence?
Nietzsche and Heidegger seem to bet, each in his own way, on
yet another possibility, though this also is tied to the unfolding
of modern science-and-technology.
For Nietzsche, the world in
which God is dead because the organization of social work has
rendered superfluous that "excessive" reassurance which it rep-
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resented, is also the world in which reality becomes lighter, in
which it becomes possible to "dream knowing one is dreaming,"
in which, finally, life can carry on within less dogmatic horizons,
contexts which are less violent and at the same time explicitly
dialogical, experimental, risky. It is true that for Nietzsche this
perspective is fundamentally open only to artists, or at any rate
only to a sector of humankind, since the majority of people, according to him, remain bound to providing, by means of planned
manual labor, the very freedom of these few. But this is probably
the aspect of his philosophy which we can define as being still
"Modern," again st the more explicit "Post-Modernity" of Heidegger. It is likely, in fact, that the elitist and aesthetic conception of
the overman on Nietzsche's part is secretly linked to an image of
the world of science-and-technology
which is fundamentally
"machinistic" [macchinica],an idea, that is, according to which
technology consists above all in the invention of machines in order
to multiply the physical strength of man and increase his capacity
of "mechanical" domination (as in moving, relocating, transporting, etc.) over nature . This conception of technology has as its
paradigmatic model the motor or the engine. To the degree in
which the capacity of the motor is seen as the capacity to channel
and utilize energy to induce modifications and physical alterations
in nature and matter, the overcoming of subjectivity which such
a technology allows coincides with the overcoming of the subjection to manual labor; yet this remains the fundamental model of
any type of labor in a world whose development is conceived
solely as an ever growing multiplication of the capacity to "move"
[spostare],to utilize energy in a mechanical sense.
We can on the other hand hold Heidegger's conception of
technology as being modelled more or less explicitly upon information theory or telematics [informatica], which constitutes the
essence of Late-Modern or Post-Modern technology. 26 The Ge-Stell
does not entail the possibility for man to dispose of his metaphysical traits as subject because, in the technological world, he becomes factory worker, part and parcel with the machine. More
radically, instead, information technology seems to render subjectivity unthinkable for it is not given to one subject to possess or
to manipulate, within a logic still bound to a master-slave
metaphysics, the information from whose coordination and connections depend the true "power" of the late-modern world. We
are not talking here of the negative utopia of the robots that would
take over the world; rather, we are more realistically taking cognizance of the intensification of social complexity, which is not
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simplified but is rendered more diffuse and pervasive by means
of the technology that goes with information. This renders the
conceiving of humanity in terms of multiple "subjective" poles,
characterized by self-consciousness and by spheres of "conflictual"
power, rather impossible. Only on this account, perhaps, can the
Nietzschean and the Heideggerian meditation on the destiny of
subjectivity in the epoch of the dissolution of being as foundation
contain for us some indications pregnant with a future.
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